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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  07-3192
____________
AQUATROL CORPORATION,
               Appellant,
v.
ALTOONA CITY AUTHORITY; G.M. MCCROSSIN, INC.,
             Appellees.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-00252)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 2, 2008
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN , Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 8, 2008 )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
  Appellees Altoona City Authority and G.M. McCrossin contest our jurisdiction1
because the contract at issue contains specific dispute resolution procedures that Aquatrol
did not invoke.  Because Defendants first raised this argument after two and a half years
of litigation and a jury trial, we deem this argument waived.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Price, 501 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2007) (the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional
and may be waived); see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 925-
26 (3d Cir. 1992) (refusing to uphold an arbitration agreement because the defendants
“actively litigat[ed]” the case for eleven months before moving to arbitrate).
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Aquatrol Corporation (Aquatrol) appeals an order of the District Court granting
Defendants’ Rule 50 motions on Aquatrol’s breach of contract and promissory estoppel
claims.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   We will affirm.1
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only those facts essential to our
decision.
In 1998, the Altoona City Authority (the Authority) contracted with G.M.
McCrossin (McCrossin) to manage the computer upgrade of the Horseshoe Curve Water
Treatment Facility Project (the Project).  The scope of the work included updating the
software utilized by the Authority to make the computer systems at five water treatment
plants Y2K-compliant.  The contract (Contract) specified that McCrossin hire Aquatrol to
complete the upgrade.  Aquatrol had installed the previous software manufactured by
Wonderware.
3In March 1999, McCrossin executed a Purchase Agreement (Agreement) with
Aquatrol for the installation and configuration of Y2K-compliant software.  The purchase
order incorporated specifications for the software upgrade and required that the work be
completed by September 1, 1999.  The specifications were created by Gwin, Dobson &
Foreman, Inc. (GD&F), the Authority’s consulting engineers.  McCrossin agreed to pay
Aquatrol $140,849.00 if the upgrade was completed satisfactorily.  McCrossin also
reserved the right to cancel the order if it was not completed as specified.
The software installation was not completed as specified.  The first attempt by
Aquatrol to install updated software was not made until December 1999 – three months
after the initial project deadline.  Moreover, neither GD&F nor the Authority was
satisfied with the update because, inter alia, the software was still not Y2K-compliant.  In
order to prevent the loss of essential data, the water treatment plant computers needed to
be set to a date prior to 2000, but all post-1999 dates could only be entered manually.  On
January 7, 2000, Aquatrol received a memo identifying the continuing failures in the
software upgrade.  Aquatrol responded to GD&F that the problems were caused by the
Wonderware software that was used for the upgrade.  On March 16, 2000, GD&F sent
Aquatrol a letter informing it that the Authority remained displeased with the software
upgrade and stated that payment would not be made until Aquatrol completed the upgrade
as specified.
4Problems with the upgrade continued.  On December 12, 2000, Aquatrol sent the
Authority a letter requesting that it agree to equipment upgrades to make the Wonderware
software work properly.  Aquatrol informed the Authority that the upgrades would add
$53,000.00 to the price of the contract.  The Authority responded that it would agree to
Aquatrol’s proposal but would not pay for the labor and expenses associated with the new
installations.  Aquatrol rejected this counterproposal.
On April 24, 2001, McCrossin sent Aquatrol a letter informing it that the Authority
issued a “deduct change” for the Aquatrol contract.  Accordingly, McCrossin requested
that Aquatrol retrieve any equipment from the Project site.  McCrossin sent Aquatrol a
final order cancelling the Agreement in its entirety on May 23, 2001.
Four months later, Aquatrol contacted the Authority with a new offer.  Based on its
understanding of the Wonderware software settings, Aquatrol offered to complete the
Project for the original contract price of $140,849.00.  The Authority rejected this offer
and eventually contracted with U.S. Filter Control Systems to complete the upgrade.
II.
Aquatrol brought a breach of contract claim against McCrossin and unjust
enrichment and promissory estoppel claims against the Authority.  Following Aquatrol’s
case in chief, the District Court granted Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of
law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  The original deadline for completion of the Agreement was September 1, 1999. 2
Although McCrossin did not terminate the Agreement on September 2, 1999, it was
within its rights to terminate for nonperformance at that time.  Nevertheless, McCrossin
gave Aquatrol an opportunity to complete performance.  Despite this additional time,
Aquatrol failed to perform as specified in the Agreement and McCrossin was forced to
terminate the Agreement in May 2001 – 21 months after the deadline specified in the
Agreement.
5
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir.
2000).  “[A] directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably
support only one conclusion.”  Id. (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
337, 356 (1991)).  In our review, we “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000).
III.
Aquatrol first argues that the District Court erred in granting McCrossin judgment
as a matter of law on Aquatrol’s breach of contract claim.  Aquatrol asserts that
McCrossin breached the Agreement when it failed to pay after Aquatrol performed the
software upgrade in conformity with all applicable specifications.
Although Aquatrol admits that the Wonderware software was not working
properly at the time that the contract was cancelled in 2001,  it asserts that the “problems2
were due to bugs in the Wonderware software selected by GD&F.”  Aquatrol claims that
6it satisfied its obligations under the Agreement because it “supplied and installed the
Wonderware software as specified in the purchase order (incorporating the
specification).”  We disagree.
Pennsylvania law states that a contractor or subcontractor, such as Aquatrol, is not
responsible for defects caused by problems in a design specification.  See A.G. Cullen
Constr. Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher Ed., 898 A.2d 1145, 1156 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006);
Rhone Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc. v. Newman Glass Works, 112 F.3d 695 (3d Cir.
1997).  See generally United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) (providing guidance
on the doctrine of implied warranty of design).  Design specifications “describe in precise
detail the materials to be employed and the manner in which the work is to be performed. 
The contractor has no discretion to deviate from the specifications, but is required to
follow them as one would a road map.”  A.G. Cullen, 898 A.2d at 1156.  In contrast,
performance specifications “set forth an objective or standard to be achieved, and the
successful bidder is expected to exercise his ingenuity in achieving that objective or
standard of performance, selecting the means and assuming a corresponding
responsibility for that selection.”  Id.  In addition, where a specification “identifies a
particular product or manufacturer by name, but permits substitution of ‘an approved
equal,’ such a specification is ‘performance’ in nature and, as a result, carries no implied
warranty.”  Id.
7The Agreement between McCrossin and Aquatrol, and the specifications
incorporated into that Agreement, demonstrate that the software upgrade was a
performance specification.  Aquatrol was hired to ensure that the “existing treatment
plants which are utilizing Aquatrol Equipment shall be upgraded with required software
and programming to make systems fully year 2000 compliant.”  Although the
specifications directed Aquatrol to “[p]rovide updated [W]onderware software for each
plant,” they also made clear that Aquatrol retained the discretion to substitute another
software product or a different version of Wonderware.  The Standard General
Conditions, as incorporated into the Contract, stated:
Whenever an item of material or equipment is specified or described in the
Contract Documents by using the name of a proprietary item or the name of
a particular Supplier, the specification or description is intended to establish
the type, function and quality required.  Unless the specification or
description contains or is followed by words reading that no like, equivalent
or ‘or-equal’ item or no substitution is permitted, other items of material or
equipment or material or equipment of other Suppliers may be accepted by
ENGINEER ... 
Accordingly, the specifications clearly stated an objective — Y2K compliance — but left
the manner of accomplishing that objective to the discretion of Aquatrol.  Aquatrol had
the freedom to either update the pre-existing Wonderware software however it saw fit, or
else choose a substitute software product of the same type, function, and quality.  In sum,
because the Agreement included performance specifications, McCrossin cannot be held
  Even if the Spearin doctrine did apply, Aquatrol could not show a defect in the3
specification requiring the use of Wonderware software.  Aquatrol admitted that the
problems occurred because it needed to change two settings in the updated Wonderware
software.  The Wonderware software, therefore, was suitable for the Project and the
specifications were free from defects.  No liability, therefore, can be assigned to
McCrossin by virtue of a defect in design.  See Dep’t of Transp. v. W. P. Dickerson &
Son, Inc., 400 A.2d 930, 362-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).  Moreover, Aquatrol was bound
by the express warranties against defective work contained in the Contract.  Aquatrol
warranted and guaranteed that all work “will not be defective” and agreed to “pay all
claims, costs, losses, and damages caused by or resulting from such correction or removal
(including but not limited to all costs of repair or replacement of work of others).”  Any
implied warranties of design “must yield to [the] express warranties against defective
materials.”  Rhone Poulenc, 112 F.3d at 698.
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responsible under Pennsylvania law for providing Aquatrol with defective design
specifications.3
Because Aquatrol failed to successfully update the Project’s software as required
by the Agreement, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting McCrossin’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on Aquatrol’s breach of contract claim.
IV.
Aquatrol next argues that the District Court erred in granting the Authority’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on Aquatrol’s promissory estoppel claim.
To recover under a claim for promissory estoppel, Aquatrol must prove that:  (1)
the Authority made a promise that it should have reasonably expected would induce
action or forbearance on the part of Aquatrol; (2) Aquatrol took action or refrained from
taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by
9enforcing the promise.  Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv. Partners, LP, 873 A.2d 710, 717-18
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
Aquatrol asserts that the Authority promised:  if “you finish the job you’re going to
get paid.”  Without deciding whether the Authority’s statements to Aquatrol constituted a
promise sufficient to support a claim for promissory estoppel, we hold that Aquatrol
cannot prevail on its promissory estoppel claim for work it did pursuant to a contract. 
Calson v. Arnot-Ogden Mem’l Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990).  Indeed, any
action that Aquatrol took was already covered by its Agreement with McCrossin. 
Aquatrol’s President, Jim McDermott, testified that he understood from the Authority that
if Aquatrol completed the job, it would get paid the original contract price.  But when
asked if it was true that “[n]one of these so-called encouragements were to do anything
else other than complete the job that you had contracted to do,” McDermott responded,
“[t]hat’s correct.”
In the event that Aquatrol alleges that it took action in reliance on promises made
by the Authority after Aquatrol’s Agreement with McCrossin terminated on May 23,
2001, we hold that Aquatrol acted on its own will.  When a party acts on its own will and
not as a result of any representation made by another, a claim for promissory estoppel
must fail.  Ravin, Inc. v. First City, Co., 692 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
Aquatrol has done no more than show that McDermott was in contact with the Authority
between May and October of 2001.  At trial, McDermott admitted:  “I don’t have any
10
dates and I didn’t make any notes on phone calls, they were just cordial phone calls that
were made — how are you doing, you know, when are you coming back, some time in the
June to the following September of ‘01 period.”  McDermott later clarified that “there
may have been phone calls in between” March and October 2001, but he does not have
any evidence of these phone calls and cannot say that he talked to anybody in particular.
Moreover, contrary to Aquatrol’s current assertion that it was relying on a promise
by the Authority to pay for any continuing work on the upgrade project, we note that
Aquatrol attempted to contract with the Authority to finally resolve the Wonderware
software problems on October 1, 2001.  In that proposal, Aquatrol stated:  “[w]e would
like to inquire if the Altoona Water Authority would like us to return and complete the
upgrade of your 5 Aquatrol systems.  . . .  In return we would receive compensation in the
original amount of $140,849.00.”  This offer was rejected by the Authority.  Accordingly,
while Aquatrol and the Authority may have been engaged in continuing discussions about
the Project, Aquatrol failed to identify any specific promise made by the Authority
sufficient to support a claim for promissory estoppel.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
